Raffles Consulting Services
Family office passkeys can reduce password risk, but privileged accounts still need inventory, recovery, device, approval and session controls.
Family office passkeys can reduce exposure to stolen passwords and phishing, but they do not remove the need to control privileged accounts. The office should know every administrator account, who can use it, which device holds the credential, how recovery works and what happens when a principal, employee or vendor leaves.
Move high-risk services in a planned order. Email, identity administration, banking, portfolio systems, cloud storage and password management deserve priority because one compromised account can be used to reach many others.
Understand what passkeys change
The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore’s current passwordless authentication advisory explains that passkeys use cryptographic credentials and trusted devices instead of asking the user to enter a reusable password. FIDO-based passkeys and hardware security keys provide strong protection against phishing.
For this reason, Passkeys can be device-bound or synchronised through an account ecosystem. Document which model each service uses, where the private credential can exist and how access moves to a replacement device. Do not assume that a familiar biometric prompt means the credential never leaves the device.
Keep the service recovery path in scope. A passkey is weakened if an attacker can reset access through a poorly protected email address, telephone number or helpdesk process.
Inventory privileged accounts before migration
List all accounts that can create users, change permissions, move money, export data, alter security settings or approve sensitive transactions. Include cloud administrators, domain accounts, banking administrators, portfolio and accounting systems, document platforms, mobile-device management and vendor support accounts.
In practice, For each account, record the service owner, named users, privilege level, authentication method, recovery contacts, registered devices, last review and emergency access method. Remove shared administrator accounts where the service supports named access.
A family member’s personal email should not be the unrecorded recovery route for a business system. Use controlled organisational contacts and make sure more than one authorised person can handle continuity without sharing a secret.
Choose the strongest method the service supports
Use phishing-resistant passkeys or hardware security keys for privileged access where available. If the service retains a password, store a unique, strong value in the approved password manager and do not use it for routine sign-in. Avoid SMS as the only second factor for high-risk accounts when stronger methods are available.
At the same time, CSA’s MFA bypass advisory warns that attackers can defeat some multi-factor methods through phishing, stolen sessions and social engineering. Train users to reject unexpected approval prompts and to stop when the domain, device or location is unfamiliar.
Require a clean managed device for administration. Patch the operating system and browser, encrypt the device and restrict unnecessary extensions. Separate routine email and web browsing from the device or profile used for the most sensitive administration where practical.
Control enrolment and recovery
Adding a passkey is itself a privileged event. Require a second authorised person to review enrolment for banking, identity and asset systems. Record the user, device, date, service and approver. Alert the security owner when a new credential or recovery method is added.
As a result, Test recovery before an emergency. Confirm how a lost device, deceased principal, unavailable employee or failed identity provider would be handled. Keep sealed emergency instructions and backup hardware in a controlled location. Review who can access them and log every test.
Do not create an emergency route that bypasses all controls. A recovery process should use verified identity, dual approval for high-impact systems and a prompt review after access is restored.
| Control area | Evidence | Review question |
|---|---|---|
| Account inventory | Named owners and privilege list | Does every administrator still need access? |
| Authentication | Passkey, key or MFA method | Is it resistant to common phishing? |
| Device | Managed device and patch status | Can malware abuse an active session? |
| Recovery | Contacts, backup credential and test log | Can access be restored without weak shortcuts? |
| Monitoring | Alerts and administrator activity log | Would an unusual change be noticed? |
Monitor sessions and sensitive actions
CSA notes that passkeys do not prevent every attack. Malware can abuse an authenticated session, stolen cookies can preserve access and social engineering can persuade an authorised user to perform a harmful action. Monitor more than sign-in success.
For example, Enable alerts for new devices, impossible travel, recovery changes, large exports, permission changes and new payment beneficiaries. Send critical alerts to a channel the same administrator cannot silently modify. Review privileged activity on a set schedule.
Keep transaction approval separate from technical administration. A person who can reset an account should not automatically be able to approve a high-value payment or change an investment mandate.
Review service integrations as part of the same exercise. An administrator may have removed a person from the main console while an old automation token, delegated mailbox or connected application still retains access. Record each integration owner, business purpose, permission scope and expiry date, then revoke credentials that no longer support an approved process.
Remove access promptly and prove it
In addition, Offboarding should revoke sessions, credentials, recovery methods, delegated access, API tokens and vendor accounts. Recover managed devices and hardware keys. Review recent activity for unusual exports, forwarding rules or permission changes.
The current CSA Cyber Essentials material provides a useful broader baseline for classical, cloud and AI security. Use it to test whether the authentication change sits inside a complete security programme.
The family office operating model is the pillar cornerstone. The agentic AI control guide covers automated actions, while the ransomware recovery guide covers restoration. The Family Office and UHNW Advisory hub connects related guidance.
For this reason, a passkey project is complete only when the office can show who has privileged access, how it is recovered, how unusual use is detected and how access is removed. The credential is one control within that record.